Quiet keys for leightweight blockcyphers

Astract:

Student Work » Finished Work » Quiet keys for leightweight blockcyphersQuiet keys for leightweight blockcyphersType of work: Bachelor's thesisStudent: Maria MöbiusSupervisor: Thomas Kittel, Markus WamserPosted: 15.12.2014Started: 15.12.2014Finished: 15.04.2015Publication: Show publicationThesis topic in co-operation with the Fraunhofer Institute for Applied and Integrated Security AISEC, Garching AbstractIn the paper [1] published by Mizuki und Hayashi in 2014, a method was presented to enable hardware designers to facilitate the evaluation of their products with respect to side channel attacks. They presented a method to nd quiet and noisy keys in the last round of AES. With these keys one expects extremely low or respectively high leakage under the assumption that the leakage function follows the hamming-distance-model. Therefore, the security of the cryptographic device and its countermeasures can be tested according to side channel attacks [cf. 1, p. 1]. The following thesis picks up this idea and analyses the AES-like lightweight block ciphers PRESENT and PRINCE according to the possibility to search for quiet (and noisy) keys. The steps of this analysis and if computable in the context of this bachelor thesis, the quiet and noisy keys will be presented.[1] Takaaki Mizuki and Yu ichi Hayashi. AES Cipher Keys Suitable for Ecient Side-Channel Vulnerability Evaluation. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2014/770, 2014.