Description
As a consequence of the tremendous increase of interconnected devices deployed in the context of Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) and the industrial Internet of Things, the need for scalable and yet secure on-boarding procedures increases. A trust relationship between a new device and its operator domain can be seen as an essential prerequisite for secure deployment, even before a device receives a particular network or application layer configuration. Cryptographic device identities and trust anchors imprinted on devices found the basis for such trust relationship. This thesis analyses the IEEE 802.1AR standard for secure device identifiers and the Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) protocol developed by the IETF ANIMA working group, and explores their suitability for providing a PKI-based security mechanism for the IACS supply chain. This thesis controversially discusses central design choices for mapping the BRSKI architecture to the architecture of IACS and evaluates its conformity with recommendations given by ISA/IEC 62443. Subsequently, this thesis designs, implements, and evaluates a testbed, which leverages BRSKI to establish locally significant identities on new devices and demonstrates the integration of BRSKI with an external domain PKI of an exemplified industrial operator. Our findings show that the BRSKI architecture can be successfully mapped to the architecture of IACS and allows for great scalability due to the high degree of automation of the secure bootstrapping process, without requiring human interaction. Moreover, our evaluation shows that BRSKI does not interfere with the strict availability requirement of industrial environments and can be operated in conformance with the security requirements defined in ISA/IEC 62443. This thesis concludes by discussing the process of device ownership verification and highlights the potential for outsourcing manufacturer-based authentication as a cloud service.
|