Description
This bachelor's thesis investigates the temperature dependency of Side-Channel Attacks, focusing on
a case study involving the Ascon cryptographic algorithm. Side-Channel Attacks are ways of compromising
the implementation of cryptographic algorithms through observing and exploiting unintended information
the computing device emits while executing a cryptographic algorithm. They are mostly of interest in the
world of IoT, where an attacker can easily gain physical access to a victim device. The objective of this
thesis is to analyse if side-channel attacks can be performed more efficiently for certain temperatures than
others. The study analyses the power consumption of a computing device performing the cipher Ascon-128a at
different temperatures ranging from -20°C to +80°C. To be able to make a statement for which temperature a
side-channel attack would be most efficient, the study measures the Signal-to-Noise Ratio of hamming weight
leakage during the Ascon initialisation phase for each temperature and compares the results. Through a systematic
examination, our findings uncover a relation between the temperature and the Signal-to-Noise Ratio of hamming
weight leakage.
Keywords: side-channel attacks, temperature dependency, Signal-to-Noise Ratio, Ascon
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Thesis topic in co-operation with the Fraunhofer Institute for Applied and Integrated Security AISEC, Garching